Sharon in
the first days of the war
Adan, Avraham recalls what Sharon did on 8th
October 1973
"Orders to commanders of divisions don't mean that they are not
responsible. Sharon as Example was ordered by Gen. Gonen to leave his sector, but he
acted strangely, he ordered his commanders of brigades to move to south
and not to leave any troops to defend that sector in spite of enemy's
activities, his sector was empty and would be easy to occupy by Egyptians, Sharon didn't clear this to Gen. Gonen before leaving his sector.
The forces have to support other near forces, this is a very important and vital factor to strengthen or weaken forces
in the field. But Sharon refused
to support my forces with an armored battalion in El-Ferdan and when Gonen ordered
him to go back to his sector, he didn't hurry up and back up my forces against
enemy, so I failed.
I should mention that there was no cooperate or control among all
levels of commanders and it was obvious when Sharon's division returned from south
to the middle sector which I left. We didn't know that Sharon came back again,
the result, troops of both divisions opened fire on each other, believing that
they were opening fire on the enemy."
Source: Adan,
Avraham (Bren). On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account
of the Yom Kippur War (Gamal
Hammad, the military historian, in his book "Military Battles on the Egyptian
Front" )
Sharon’s division did not support
either of them.
(We were following Sharon’s division.
Around noon on 8th Oct. Sharon’s division moved towards east of Suez
where Mindler’s division was fighting against forces of the 3rd army
trying to penetrate them. It was clear that Sharon’s division would
cooperate with Mindler’s division hoping to achieve the counter-attack after failing to
do that towards the 2nd army.
While Sharon’s division was moving
south towards Suez , Adan’s division was losing facing the 2nd
army and had to get back to the east to take defensive positions. General Gonen had to get Sharon’s division back .
At the end of the fighting, Adan’s
division was beaten by the 2nd army, and mindler’s division by the 3rd
army and Sharon’s division did not cooperate with either of them)-Mohammed Abdel
Ghany Al Gamsy.
Source: October 1973 war
book for
Mohammed Abdel Ghany Al Gamsy Chief of operations of Egyptian army
during the war.
Sharon in the last
days of the war
Sharon failed to occupy El-Ismailia
"The 2nd Egyptian army (two mechanical infantry brigade -number 10
and 118- paratroopers brigade number 182 and special forces platoon
number 129, almost a whole mixed division) faced Sharon's division (two armored
brigades and one paratroopers brigade).
On 20th of October 1973, Southern Israeli commander (Gonen)
informed Sharon
that Cease-Fire was to be issued. Sharon, the commander of operation group number 143,
started managing his last battle towards El-Ismailia. In the early morning,
Israeli plans attacked El-Ismailia , Por Said and Por Fouad cities focusing on all
SAM
missiles and anti-planes weapons also Egyptian troops in Gala' camp and Maryam Mountin area, planes used
time and Napalm bombs. Sharon used all
the forces he had to reach and cross El-Ismaillia canal in order to occupy El-Ismailia and
then stopping all major supplies coming from
Cairo and east Delta to the 2nd Egyptian army in the east of the canal.
Sharon was sure that the fall of
El-Ismailia would be a big
international political event, and he might be famous with a high military
glory. But his hopes and dreams were broken for two reasons:-
First: the nature of the land of the war.
Second: the tough resistance of 2nd Egyptian army along El-Ismailia canal forced Sharon's division to
stop moving and couldn't cross the canal to El-Ismailia.
At 21/22 night, 2nd army artillery commander Gen. Major Mohamed Abdel
Halim Abo Ghazala opened fire all the night on Sharon's division. In the morning
Israeli plans attacked our forces ..... It was dark, and cease-fire
began on 22 of October, there were a lot of wounded Israelis at the
battlefield, Sharon asked for helicopters to save them but General Bar Lev
didn't approve his request, because it was dark night and difficult for
helicopters to land near the battle . Sharon ordered his men to rely on
themselves to save the wounded soldiers. Rescue operation took 4 hours to move all
wounded and dead soldiers from the battlefield."
Source: Gamal
Hammad, the military historian, in his book "Military Battles on the Egyptian
Front".
Comments about Sharon after
the war
About crossing to the west of the canal, David Elazar
chief of Israeli staff on 3rd December 1973, says (Sharon still continues his
irresponsible declaration to journalists trying to lessen the role of other
leaders to appear as an unique champion, although he knows well that our
crossing to the western side of the canal caused too much losses. However, we
could not, along ten days of fighting, overcome any of Egyptian armies. The
second army resisted and prevented us ultimately to reach
El-Ismailia city.
As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them, they resisted and advanced
to occupy, in fact, a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we
defeated or conquered them)
chief of Israeli staff - David Elazar.
